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1. INTRODUCTION 
A Balance of System (BoS) comprises all the non-module 
components of Photovoltaic (PV) power plants. Failures of 
BoS components are the major reason behind the presence of 
non-producing modules in PV field. Ten years survey [1] was 
carried out by Sandia National Laboratories on 35 PV systems, 
and results showed that failure of BoS components such as 
switches, fuses, dc contactors and surge arrestors were 
responsible for 54 % of the non-producing modules that were 
found, around 10,000 non-working modules. The layout of the 
PV system varies according to the architecture design; it can be 
a single- inverter system where all the strings are connected to a 
central inverter: a string-inverter system where each string has 
its own inverter, or a multi-inverter system where the PV field 
is divided into groups of strings connected to an inverter. 
Accordingly, BoS varies in design according to the layout of the 
PV systems. The most optimized BoS whose components are 
the basic for any design is presented in Figure 1. The failure of  
 
 
 
any of its components contributes significantly in the failures of 
PV system. It is worth mentioning that protection equipment is 
excluded since the utility switchgear is sufficient for the 
protection purposes of an optimum BoS. It is worth noting that 
the utility switchgear is full of protection relays and tripping 
equipment that trip immediately the PV plant in case of any 
power faults. 
 
Figure 1. BoS Components.  
ABSTRACT 
The Photovoltaic (PV) system is divided mainly into two subsystems; PV modules and a Balance of System (BoS) subsystems. This work 
shows two approaches for a reliability analysis on the subsystem level of aBoS: Failure mode effects criticality analysis (FMECA) and a 
Markov Process. FMECA concerns the root causes of failures and introduces prioritization numbers to highlight critical components of 
a BoS. Meanwhile, a Markov process is a reliability methodology that aims to predict the probability of success and failure of a BoS. In 
this way, a Markov process is a supportive tool for helping decision-makers to judge the criticality of failures associated with the 
operation of PV systems. Results show that the PV inverter contributes significantly to the failures of a BoS. Accordingly, further 
investigations are conducted on a PV inverter to prioritize the maintenance activities by determining the risk priority number of its 
component failures through quantitative CA. The novelty of the proposed methodologies stems from analyzing the roots of failure 
causes of BoS components and estimating the probability of failure of these components in order to improve the early development of 
a BoS, enhance maintenance management, and satisfy the demanding reliability by electric utilities. 
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In literature, most of the studies focus on PV modules 
reliability evaluation and only very limited publications consider 
the reliability of BoS. Among these publications, a qualitative 
reliability analysis is presented in [2] using fault tree analysis and 
other efforts in [3] investigated the reliability of both PV 
modules and BoS using Petri's networks in order to estimate 
the lifetime, reliability, and availability.  
In general, the first step towards enhancing a system’s 
reliability is to detect the root causes of systems’ failures. In this 
respect, Failure Mode Effect Criticality Analysis (FMECA), a 
well-known methodology, is used in order to analyze the failure 
causes of systems. It focuses mainly on identifying the possible 
failure causes. In addition, it is one among several methods 
used for risk assessment and management by selecting the most 
proper maintenance strategies to enhance the system 
performance.  
A recent research [4] applied FMECA on a PV system 
designed by Brookhaven National Laboratory and results show 
that inverter and ground system of the PV system have the 
highest Risk Priority Number (RPN). It provides a strong 
investigation of the FMECA on all PV system components; 
however [4] considered a specific design and did not list 
recommended actions to limit the failure causes, and the 
potential failure modes were listed without highlighting the 
contribution of each system component in the failure of the 
whole PV system. 
On the other hand, the FMECA methodology, in this work, 
is limited with more details to BoS only whose components are 
more optimized. The failure causes of each component are 
studied in detail, and recommended actions are listed. In 
addition, a prioritization number is assigned to each failure, 
based on IEC-60182, to improve the maintenance activities. 
Moreover, a further reliability investigation is carried out by a 
Markov Process to be a supportive tool along with FMECA in 
case of any confusion on judging the priority number by 
maintenance management. More details on the confusion of 
judging RPN is available in [5].  
Both techniques illustrate results that can be utilized during 
the design phase in order to reduce the major field problems 
and improve the reliability of the systems. Also, they can be 
used during the operation phase by improving the maintenance 
management and reducing the failure probability of occurrence. 
This paper is organized as follows; Section 2 provides a 
general overview on the failure causes of BoS components; 
Section 3 presents FMECA results; Section 4 shows the 
Markov process conducted on BoS; and Section 5 focuses only 
on Criticality Analysis (CA) of the PV inverter. Finally, Section 
6 includes the conclusions. 
2. BALANCE OF SYSTEM FAILURE CAUSES 
Mapping the failure causes is the first step towards the 
reliability analysis for determining the underlying failures and 
enhancing failure prediction methods. Figure 2 shows a 
schematic diagram of optimized BoS that consists of the 
necessary components needed to be installed on a PV string. In 
this section, the failure cause of each BoS’s component is 
described in detail. 
2.1. AC and DC cables 
AC and DC cables represent the veins of PV systems and 
their failures result in partial or complete shutting down of the 
PV plant. In addition, cable problems at the module levels can 
lead to a severe mismatch for other modules cabled in the same 
parallel block [6] and result in drop of the output power. Loose 
cables by poor workmanship due to excess torque and pressure 
during installation, undersized cables, overvoltage and over- 
current, insufficient protection are the main causes for PV 
cabling. 
2.2. Bypass diode 
Bypass diodes are usually supplied inside the module 
junction box or manufactured only inside PV modules for 
sophisticated module types only [7]. A study was carried out in 
[8] on 1272 modules showed that 47 % of the modules have 
defective bypass diodes and 3 % of the defective bypass diode 
caused burn mark on the modules. Generally, the main function 
of a bypass diode is to allow the current to pass around the 
shaded or cracked cells and thereby reduces the power losses 
within the module itself. Hence, hot spots will be avoided and a 
long lifetime of the system will be guaranteed [9]. Bypass diodes 
have a junction temperature reaching up to 150-200 °C and 
they possess a significant self-heating [10], however the main 
reason of their failures is the applicable thermal stress during 
their operation because they are not exposed to sufficient air 
flow for cooling. 
2.3. String fuse 
Depending on the necessary capacity of a PV system, there 
might be several strings which are connected in parallel for 
higher currents and more power. Only PV systems that have at 
least three strings require a fuse to be placed on each string. PV 
systems which have less than three strings will not generate 
sufficient fault current and do not present a safety hazard [11]. 
In general, a fuse can be considered as a conductor with a 
relatively low melting temperature surrounded by a dielectric 
insulator. String fuses have different failure modes that can be 
summarized into false operation, design factor, cracks of 
dielectric packaging and shift in fuse resistance; the resistance is 
increased during the normal operation, or it becomes relatively 
low during tripping [12],[13]. Moreover, the fatigue factor 
contributes to the aforementioned failure modes; string fuses 
are subjected to wear out since switching on and off would heat 
up and cool down the fuses. Consequently, fuse fatigue is 
developed by time. 
2.4. AC and DC isolation switches 
IEEE Std C37.100-1992 [14] defines the isolating switch as a 
mechanical switching device used for changing the connection 
in a circuit or for isolating a circuit or equipment from the 
power source. In PV systems, the installation of a DC switch 
on each string is necessary for maintenance purposes of strings 
in order to avoid shutting down the inverter and consequently 
disconnecting the whole strings.  
On the AC side, the cable connecting the inverter to the grid 
is usually dimensioned to carry currents higher than the 
maximum current which the inverter can deliver. So a 
 
Figure 2. BoS of PV string. 
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protection against overload is not necessary and a circuit 
breaker at the utility switchgear is sufficient to protect against 
faults from the grid. However, an AC switch is still necessary 
and should be installed for maintenance purposes of the 
inverter [15]. 
 The most common failure mode of isolating switches is a 
failure in the mechanical mechanism; thus the switch fails to 
open or close, and contacts will carbonize; that results in local 
temperature rise and reduction of contact quality. 
2.5. Inverter 
In a grid-connected PV plant, the inverter represents an 
expensive and complex key component. A typical three-phase 
PV inverter includes: IGBT Power modules, cooling fans, 
control software and DC link capacitors implemented on 
Printed Circuit Boards (PCBs) in addition to AC & DC 
contactors. An IGBT power module fails as a result of thermal 
runaway [16], ceramic substrate to base plate solder fatigue [17], 
partial discharge [18], and FWD if short circuited [19]. AC and 
DC contactors fail to open or close due to design defects, 
mechanical locks, failure of the tripping coil, arcs and 
overheating that cause degradation of the electric contacts. 
Solder fractures and cracks are the main failure causes of PCBs 
and result in overheating and gradual resistance increase of the 
solder joints [20]. The control software fails in case of improper 
design, absence of health monitoring facility and incapability to 
adapt the change in electrical and environmental parameters. 
2.6. Surge arrestors 
Surge arrestors are designed to isolate the PV circuit from the 
ground during normal voltage operation and to connect to 
ground when the voltage of the line exceeds the threshold 
value. In PV systems, they are installed to provide a complete 
protection against lightning and induced over-voltages. On 
the DC side, a surge protection device is always placed on the 
supply side of the inverter’s isolating device in order to 
provide a complete protection when the isolating device is 
opened. In service, surge arrestors are exposed to frequent 
lightening that results in excessive overheating and leads to 
degradation of its characteristics. Also, moisture ingress can 
find its way inside the surge arrestor in case of sealing defects 
and contribute in dielectric degradation. 
3. FAILURE MODE EFFECT CRITICALITY ANALYSIS 
FMECA consists of two separate parts, the Failure Mode 
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and the Criticality Analysis (CA). 
FMEA includes a list of possible equipment failure modes, 
reason of these failures, local and final effects that refer to the 
impact of each failure on the system element and the whole 
system respectively, and the alternative recommended 
corrective actions to avoid each failure [21].  
On the other hand, Criticality Analysis plans and focuses the 
maintenance activities according to a set of priorities by giving 
failures with the highest risk the highest priority. 
3.1. FMEA on BoS 
The analysis starts with gathering information on the 
functions and failures of BoS components. The impact of each 
failure cause for each component is investigated on the 
component itself and the PV modules and strings, stated in the 
local effect. Afterwards, the impact of each component failure, 
on the whole PV system, is stated in final effect. Finally, the 
most proper recommendations are given to reduce the failure 
of each BoS component. The working of FMEA on BoS is 
listed in Table 2. 
3.2. CA on BoS 
The criticality is a manner to quantify how much attention is 
necessary to pay about determined component failure or event; 
this is carried out either through qualitative means based on 
experience and field background or quantitative means if 
previous failure data are available. Currently, field data are not 
available for BoS, therefore, a qualitative CA is the most 
relevant means to evaluate CA. This is managed by assigning 
each failure mode to a Risk Priority Number (RPN), defined by 
RPN = O × S × D, where S represents a scale for the failure 
severity and the risks behind the failure occurrence, O denotes 
the probability of failure mode occurrence, and D means 
detection, and represents the possibility to recognize the failure 
before the system or the customers are affected. For 
expectation purposes of components’ failures, an IEC 
evaluation criterion is selected as shown in Table 1. 
In the CA evaluation, the occurrence is evaluated in 
accordance to the failure rate of the BoS components stated in 
Table 3; the severity is based on the expected interruption of 
power and possible damages to PV modules, and detection 
considers the fault detection tools and equipment in the field. 
The evaluated RPN is presented in Figure 3.  
It is depicted from Figure 3 that the inverter has the highest 
RPN because of the complexity of its components. The bypass 
diode follows the inverter since its rate of occurrence is quite 
high compared to the rest of other components; its failure 
results in burned marks on PV modules and reduction of 
Table 1. IEC-60182 evaluation criteria for occurrence, severity, detection. 
Occurrence  
   ( O) 
Severity  
  ( S) 
Detection 
   ( D) 
Ranking 
Failure is unlikely No 
discernible 
effect 
Almost 
certain 
1 
Low: 
Relatively few 
failures 
Very minor Very high 2 
Minor High 3 
Moderate: 
Occasional failures 
Very low Moderately 
high 
4 
Low Moderate 5 
Moderate Low 6 
High: 
Repeated Failures 
High Very low 7 
Very high Remote 8 
Very high: 
Failure is almost 
unavoidable 
Hazardous 
with warning 
Very remote 9 
 
 
Table 3. Component adopted failure rates. 
               Component               Failure rate 
Bypass diode 0.027 f/year [26] 
DC switch 0.0018 f/year [27] 
AC wire 0.00011 f/year. [28] 
DC wire 0.00042 f/year. [28 ] 
AC Switch 0.0003 f/year [27] 
String fuse 0.00017 f/yr [26] 
Photovoltaic inverter 0.125 f/year [25] 
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power. In the field, failure detection of the bypass diode is done 
by infrared cameras and signal transmitter devices. Both the 
inverter and bypass diode are the key elements for a safe system 
operation; therefore, it is recommended to conduct the 
aforementioned detection procedures of the bypass diodes 
along with the routine maintenance of the PV inverter in time. 
On the other hand, the surge arrestor has the lowest RPN, 
since it is very rarely when it fails in short circuit mode, and it is 
not opening the circuit in case of open circuit mode. 
4. MARKOV ANALYSIS ON BOS 
A Markov process is a sequences of random variables in 
which the future variable is determined by the present variable 
and independent on the way in which the present state arose 
from its predecessors. The analysis looks at a sequence of 
events and analyzes the tendency of one event to be followed 
by another [22]. This tendency is the probability evaluation of 
transition from one state to another until the system has 
reached the final state. Thus, a Markov process is defined by a 
process {p(t), t≥0} with state space X={0,1,2,3,….r} and 
stationary transition probabilities: 
𝑃ij= 𝑃𝑃(𝑝(𝑡) = 𝑗│ 𝑝(0) = 𝑖) 𝑓𝑓𝑃 𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈  𝑋 (1) 
where p(t) is a random variable denotes the state and belongs 
to state space X. The rate of change from one state to another 
is estimated based on the transient analysis point of view, 
through Kolmogorov forward equations, 
Table 2. FMECA on BoS. 
Su
bs
ys
te
m
 
    
   
   
 
 Outage 
mode Possible outage cause Local effect Final effect 
Compensating provision 
against failure S O D RPN 
Bo
S 
AC Cables Thermal expansion 
and contraction. 
Loose cables. 
Undersized cables. 
Overvoltage and over 
current. 
Slow output power 
degradation and 
increased power 
losses 
Shutdown of one or 
more PV strings. 
Arcs and fire risk 
Minimizing electrical 
cables wiring, proper 
design, sufficient 
protection, using cable 
ducts, routine visual 
inspection 
3 2 2 12 
DC cables 3 3 2 18 
Bypass 
diodes 
Thermal stress, 
insufficient cooling. 
Over voltages and high 
currents. 
Insufficient rating 
 
Hot spots and burn 
marks on PV module 
Bypass diode is open 
circuited: no change 
in output power. 
Bypass diode short 
circuited: Significant 
drop of power. 
proper design, installing 
surge arrestors 
5 6 2 60 
String fuses False operation. 
Improper design, 
cracks of dielectric 
packaging. 
Shift in fuse 
resistance, Thermal 
wear out. 
 
In closed circuit mode: 
Slow output 
degradation and 
increase of power 
losses. 
In open circuit mode: 
isolation of the one or 
more strings 
Significant reduction 
of output power 
Proper design, installing 
surge arrestors. 
Regular visual inspection 
3 2 3 18 
DC  isolating 
switches 
Mechanical 
mechanism Failure, 
improper design, 
carbonized contacts 
Increase in contact 
resistance and power 
losses 
Partial or complete 
shutdown of the PV 
system 
Enhance periodic 
maintenance and proper 
inspection of operating 
mechanism 
 
4 5 2 40 
AC  isolating 
switches 
4 3 2 24 
Surge 
arrestors 
Excessive overheating 
Sealing defects and 
environmental 
contamination  
Characteristics 
degradation. 
 leakage current 
increases and 
dielectric integrity fails 
to discharge over 
voltages. 
Partial discharge 
arching, induced  
over voltages and 
lightning strikes on 
PV equipment 
Regular testing ( leakage 
current and Meggar) 
Visual inspection to avoid 
dust accumulation and 
sealing defects. 
Maintaining and ensuring 
proper grounding systems. 
2 2 3 12 
 
Figure 3. RPN of BoS components. 
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d𝑝(𝑡)
d𝑡
= 𝑝(𝑡).𝐀                                         (2) 
and  
�P(𝑡)𝑛
𝑗=0
= 1 (3) 
where d𝑝(𝑡)
d𝑡
 is a vector that represents the state probability p(t) 
at time t, and A is a matrix of transition probability between 
states. As the number of possible states are finite, (3) is 
necessary because the probabilities of all states at any time t 
should equal 1 and the system can be in one and only one of 
these states. In case of zero repair rates, i.e. Poisson birth-death 
process, (2) can be rewritten as 
d𝑝𝑖(𝑡)
d𝑡
= – ∑ λ𝑖,𝑗 𝑖≠𝑗 𝑃𝑖(𝑡) +  ∑ λ𝑗,𝑖 𝑖≠𝑗 𝑃𝑗(𝑡)   (4) 
 
Although a Markov process, from the theoretical viewpoint, is 
flexible and versatile, special precautions are necessary to deal 
about the difficulties of practical applications. The main 
problem is that the number of system states and possible 
transitions increases rapidly with the number of events in the 
system [23].  Therefore, assumptions become a necessity. The 
usual assumptions considered by current standards and 
references, i.e. IEC-61165 [23], IEC 61508[24], and [22], can be 
summarized as follows: i) failure and repair rate are constant, ii) 
failure and repair events are independent, iii) the transition 
probability from one state to another state occurs within a very 
small time interval, iv) only one event occurs at the same time.  
In systems modelling without repairs, IEC-61165 [23] 
considered three possible states for the system: The up, 
degraded and absorbing states. The up state represents a system 
free of any failure. The degraded state is related to a system 
state whose performance meets the warranty limits although its 
operation is associated with failures. Absorbing states are the 
final states for the system when it falls. In the Markov process, 
states are absorbing if they are once reached by the system; the 
system will remain there forever.  
The term BoS is a very general term since it includes all the non 
PV module components and it depends as well on the design of 
the PV system, whether it is a central inverter, a string-inverter 
system or a multi inverter PV system. Therefore, the reliability 
analysis is carried out on the BoS components of the PV string 
shown in Figure 2. It is assumed that the surge arrestor never 
fails in short circuit mode and it is not opening the circuit in 
case of failure; therefore it will be excluded from the Markov 
process analysis.  
The major problem that always appears on any reliability study 
concerning the PV system is the lack of PV components failure 
information and absence of reliability, therefore the 
components failure rate of the BoS are gathered from literature 
[26]-[28] in Table 3. It is worth to mention that the inverter 
failure rate is calculated by considering one failure in 8 years 
[25] so the failure rate is 0.125 failure/year. 
According to the string configuration shown in Figure 2, 
once any component fails the whole PV string fails; therefore, 
each components is assumed to have two states: up and down. 
All the possible scenarios for the failures of the string BoS 
components are listed in Table 4. Accordingly, the state 
transition diagram is illustrated in Figure 4. Consequently, the 
state equations of a string BoS can be estimated from (4) as 
follows: 
𝑃0
∗(𝑡) = −(𝜆1 + 𝜆2 + 𝜆3 + 𝜆4 + 𝜆5 + 𝜆6 + 𝜆7)𝑃0(𝑡) (5) 
From the definition, reliability is the probability to perform 
its required function without any failures, under given 
conditions and for a stated period of time. Therefore, the string 
BoS reliability is equal to the probability of state 0,  𝑃0(𝑡). 
Hence 𝑅(𝑡) is presented in Figure 5. 
Based on Figure 5, the MTTF of a string BoS is around 6 
years which is close to the MTTF of the inverter. In order to 
highlight the impact of the inverter on the reliability of the 
string BoS, Figure 6 is given. The MTTF of the string BoS 
without the inverter is around 33 years. 
 
Figure 5. Reliability of string BoS. 
Table 4. System states. 
State Scenario 
0 All components work 
1 Bypass diode  fails 
2  DC switch fails 
3  AC wire  fails 
4 DC wire fails 
5 AC Switch fails 
6 String fuse fails 
7 Photovoltaic inverter fails 
 
λ1
λ2
λ3
λ4
λ5
λ6
λ7
 
Figure 4. State transition diagram of string BoS failures. 
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5. CRITICALITY ANALYSIS OF PV INVERTER 
Our past work in [29] considers the PV Inverter (PVI) to be 
just a  component among other BoS components. However, 
results of CA on BoS, presented in Figure 3, show that PVI 
contributes significantly in the failures of BoS. Meanwhile, the 
main concern of the current studies is quite limited to reliability 
estimations of PVI and reliability improvements of current PVI 
[30]-[34]. 
Therefore, performing a CA on PVI components is very 
crucial to implement the best preventive measures, based on the 
prioritization of  failure modes for PVI components, in order to 
limit and avoid the outage modes of PVI and reduce the risk 
number of PVI in the CA of BoS. 
The availability of failure data plays a critical role in 
determining whether the CA will be qualitative, based on  
previous failure information or quantitative, based on past 
experience in the field. Both approaches, however, require an 
identification of the system components as a first step before 
carrying out the CA. 
A typical three phase PVI includes: IGBT Power modules, 
cooling fans, control software and DC link capacitors 
implemented on Printed Circuit Boards (PCBs) in addition to 
AC & DC contactors. 
A quantitative CA approach is followed up for PVI based on 
a survey carried out by SunEdison Company that operates more 
than 600 PV systems in four continents with 1500 in-service 
inverters from 16 vendors and more than 2.2 million PV 
modules from 35 manufacturers [35]. The surveyed period is 
during interval January 2010 and March 2012 for 350 systems. 
The most significant failure modes of PVI inverters in the 
SunEdison survey are shown in Table 5. Inverter tickets are 
issued whenever there is a reported failure with PVI. 
Accordingly, both the percentage of tickets and kWh lost 
reflects the occurrence (O) and severity (S) of CA respectively. 
In regards to occurrence, failures modes which have 
percentage of tickets greater than 30 % are considered very high 
and almost unavoidable failures, percentage of tickets in 
between 10 % to 20 % and 20 to 30 % are assigned to 
occasional and high repeated failures, respectively. Meanwhile, a 
failure mode which has a ticket percentage less than 10 % 
represents failures with low occurrence. 
The severity of the failure mode is evaluated considering the 
performance and safety issues resulting from the occurrence of 
each failure mode. Severity is considered low or minor if the 
percentage of lost kWh is less than 10 %. It is assigned to 
moderate, high, and very high rankings when the percentage of 
lost kWh reaches 10 %-20 %, 20 %-30 % and more than 30 %, 
respectively. 
 The detection (D) is measured according to the probability 
of identifying the failure before the system is affected. This can 
be carried out through the different field indicators. For 
instance, the alarming system, visual inspection, and comparing 
measured parameters of monitoring systems to reference 
values. 
CA is conducted based on both Table 2 and Table 5, and 
RPN are evaluated in Table 6.  
In the detection evaluation, it is worth mentioning that 
IGBT and PCB are assigned to very low and low detection 
possibilities, respectively, according to IEC criteria, since both 
are hard to be detected in the field and several studies are 
currently available to enhance their detection methods. On the 
other hand, Control software has the highest detection 
possibility; because the changes in generated electricity can be 
easily observed with a strong power and energy metering. 
Moreover, the protection scheme is tested frequently in the site 
during the scheduled maintenance activities. 
Results of CA in Table 6 show that PCB has the highest 
RPN compared to the rest of the components. Although it has 
a low rate of occurrence, its severity is the highest, because the 
highest percentage of kWh in SunEdison is assigned to its 
failures. In addition, it has a high detection ranking since the 
failure detection possibilities of PCBs in the field are very 
limited. 
Table 5 Frequency of tickets and associated energy loss for each PVI 
failure mode. 
Specific failure 
Area 
Percentage of 
tickets 
Percentage of kWh 
lost 
Control 
software 
28 % 15 % 
PCB board 13 % 22 % 
AC contactors 12 % 13 % 
DC contactor 4 % 1 % 
Fans 6 % 5 % 
IGBT modules 6 % 5 % 
Capacitors 3 % 7 % 
 
Table 6. CA of PVI. 
 
Component failure S O D RPN 
IGBT Power Module 3 3 7 63 
DC link Capacitor 3 2 5 30 
AC/DC contactors 6 5 5 150 
Cooling fans 4 3 4 48 
PCB 7 4 6 168 
Control software 6 7 3 126 
 
 
Figure 6. Comparison of string BoS reliability w and w/o inverter. 
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Meanwhile, AC/DC contactors recorded the second highest 
RPN because of their high assigned severity value in SunEdison 
survey. Improper operation of the contactor subjects the 
human’s life to danger and contributes to fault propagation in 
the grid. In the field, AC/DC contactors, generally, have 
moderate detection facility during routine protection tests only. 
Control software has the third highest detection possibility. 
Although the failure detection of control software can be easily 
detected in the field. 
The IGBT power module has a quite moderate RPN. The 
IGBT power module has the highest detection ranking since it 
is generally quite difficult in the field to detect its failure. 
However, both their recorded failures occurrence and the 
percentage of losses kWh in the SunEdison survey are 
moderate compared to other failures. Consequently, the IGBT 
order is the fourth in the priority. 
  Both cooling fans and DC link capacitors have  the lowest 
RPN. In the SunEdison survey their failures have insignificant 
impact on power interruption, and they have low failure 
frequency of occurrence as well. 
In addition, both cooling fans and DC link capacitors have 
high possibilities to be detected in the field. For instance the 
IPC-9591 standard [36] specified six symptoms for cooling 
fans’ failures in the field: shaft rotational speed reduction, 
current consumption increase, loud noise, incorrect or erratic 
operation of electronic interface, visible cracking of the 
structure, and visible leakage of lubricants. On the other side, 
the DC link capacitor symptoms of failures can be detected 
through RF noise during operation and dissipation factor tests 
during maintenances besides ESR monitoring during its 
operation. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The root failure causes of PV string BoS are studied in detail 
through a FMEA approach, and a qualitative CA was 
conducted in order to prioritize these failure causes, to enhance 
BoS maintenance activities and decision-making. CA shows that 
the PV inverter has a high RPN compared to other failure 
causes and this result was supported by a Markov Process. In 
the Markov analysis, the MTTF of string BoS is significantly 
low, around six years, due to the high failure rate of the 
inverter. The estimated MTTF of string BoS excluding the 
inverter impact is around 33 years; this can be an accepted value 
compared to the lifetime of a PV module. Further 
investigations are conducted on the PVI to prioritize the 
maintenance activities by determining the RPN of its 
component failures through quantitative CA. 
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